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SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

16 November 1951

25X5

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

Colonel B. B. Talley, G-2
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AFOIN
Colonel S. M. Lansing, JIG

SUBJECT : SE-20: The Effect on the Communists of Certain
US Courses of Action

1. Subject estimate was requested by the NSC Senior Staff on a "crash" basis simultaneously with the request made for an estimate essentially covered by scope of NIE-55.

2. We note that, partially, this corollary to NIE-55 is designed to bring up to date matters covered in SE-5, "The Vulnerabilities of Communist China," dated 22 May 1951, and SE-9, "Probable Developments in the Far East Following a Failure in the Cease-Fire Negotiations in Korea," dated 6 August 1951.

3. In view of the urgency of the project we request your cooperation in meeting with us on the attached draft terms of reference at 2:30 Monday, 19 November, in Room 146 South Building.

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Executive Secretary

Distribution "B"

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

16 November 1951

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: SE-20: THE EFFECT ON THE
COMMUNISTS OF CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION

THE PROBLEM

To estimate (1) the vulnerability of the Communists to certain US courses of action, and (2) the Communist reaction to these courses of action.*

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. MAJOR OFFENSIVE USING ALL AVAILABLE WEAPONS

A. If the US should press the war more vigorously in Korea using all available weapons and, in conjunction with this offensive, carry out bombing attacks on

* The question, except in the case of the shipping embargo and naval blockade, of whether the UN would support US policy in this regard is beyond the scope of this paper.

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military installations and lines of communications in Manchuria, what would be the vulnerability of the Communists to this course of action?

B. What reaction from the Communists could be expected?

II. SHIPPING EMBARGO AND NAVAL BLOCKADE

A. If the US, supported by its major allies, should institute a shipping embargo of Communist China, what would be the vulnerability of the Communists to this course of action? (See Annex "A")

B. If the US, supported by its major allies, should institute a naval blockade of Communist China, what would be the vulnerability of the Communists to this course of action?

1. Of contraband imports?

2. A complete blockade?

C. What would be the Communist reaction to these courses of action?

- 2 -

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III. BOMBING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT CHINA

- A. If the US should launch a systematic air and naval bombardment of Communist China, what would be the vulnerability of the Communists of this course of action?
- B. What would be the reaction of the Communists to this course of action?

IV. SUPPORT OF GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

- A. What is the extent of the vulnerability of Communist China to US supported guerrilla activity? (See Annex "B")
 - 1. Under present circumstances?
 - 2. In conjunction with the other courses of action discussed in this estimate?
- B. What would be the reaction of the Communists to this course of action?

V. CHINESE NATIONALIST ATTACK WITH US LOGISTIC SUPPORT

- A. What is the vulnerability of Communist China to attacks by the Chinese Nationalists supported logistically by the US?

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1. Under conditions of presently contemplated US aid and removal of restrictions on Nationalist operations against the mainland?
2. Under conditions of greatly expanded US logistic support, but not operational support, of the Nationalists?

B. What would be the Communist reaction to this course of action?

VI. CHINESE NATIONALIST INVASION WITH US LOGISTIC AND NAVAL SUPPORT

A. If the US provided full logistic support and Naval support for the Chinese Nationalists, what would be the Chinese Communist vulnerability to Chinese Nationalist invasion?

B. What would be the Communist reaction to this course of action?

VII. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ALL THESE COURSES OF ACTION

A. What would be the cumulative vulnerability of Communist China if the US undertook all the courses of action discussed above?

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B. What would be the Communist reaction to all these courses of action?

ANNEXA

A. Foreign trade data for Communist China by month during 1951.

B. The guerrilla situation in Communist China.

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